Where We Go One, We Go All:  QAnon and Violent Rhetoric on Twitter by Planck, Samuel
Locus: The Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research 
Volume 3 Article 11 
October 2020 
Where We Go One, We Go All: QAnon and Violent Rhetoric on 
Twitter 
Samuel Planck 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/locus 
Recommended Citation 
Planck, Samuel (2020) "Where We Go One, We Go All: QAnon and Violent Rhetoric on Twitter," Locus: The 
Seton Hall Journal of Undergraduate Research: Vol. 3 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/locus/vol3/iss1/11 
Where We Go One, We Go All:
QAnon and Violent Rhetoric on Twitter
Samuel Planck
Seton Hall University
Abstract
This study concerns the rhetoric of the QAnon
conspiracy theory as it appears on Twitter, and
compares that rhetoric to that of mainstream con-
servatives on the same platform. By coding indi-
vidual tweets’ content for specific instances of vi-
olent, religious, economic, or paranoid rhetoric,
and comparing samples of both of these popu-
lations, the study aims to determine what differ-
ences there are between the QAnon community’s
uses of rhetoric, particularly violent rhetoric, and
that of the mainstream conservative community.
The results demonstrate that the QAnon move-
ment is more likely to use violent terminology in
their tweets, but is not able to find strong correla-
tions between violent rhetoric and other forms of
speech, such as paranoia or religiosity. Likewise,
the QAnon movement frequently focuses on ritual-
istic cults or on accusations of satanism, but not
in sufficient numbers to demonstrate a correlation
between such accusations and violence.
1. Introduction
The far-right movement known as QAnon has
become an increasingly potent phenomenon on
social media, and in real life. Dedicated to a con-
spiracy theory centered around President Donald
Trump and a mysterious figure in the administra-
tion known as ‘Q’, the theory began on anony-
mous messaging board 4Chan in 2017, offering
explanations for the lack of arrests of figures like
Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama. The move-
ment was one of many listed as part of an FBI in-
telligence bulletin concerning conspiracy theory-
related violence (Fringe Political Conspiracy The-
ories). Followers of the theory have commit-
ted several violent crimes: from murder attempts,
both successful (Watkins) and failed (Haag and
Salam), to trespassing, to vandalism (McIntire and
Roose). How does the rhetoric of these move-
ments on social media sites, for instance Twit-
ter, differ from the conservative movement as a
whole? What specific topics do these conspiracy
theorists concern themselves with?
This paper will seek to explore these questions
by conducting an analysis of QAnon Twitter data
and comparing it to a sample of mainstream con-
servative tweets. The author will then perform
content analysis on both samples, to determine
where the QAnon theory fits into the Conservative
Twitter landscape. Principally, the paper seeks to
prove that the amount of paranoia in a tweet is pre-
dictive of the amount of violence that tweet will
display.
2. Literature Review
The first issue debated by scholars is that of
collection methodology. Most scholarship falls
into three categories in this regard. The first two
concern networks and clusters of individual ac-
counts, attempting to map relationships so that re-
searchers may better understand the greater pic-
tures of how individual accounts interact with
each other. The two types I have identified for
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these purposes are follow-based or activity-based.
The first is demonstrated in the paper “The Aus-
tralian Twittersphere in 2016: Mapping the Fol-
lower/Followee Network”. The authors proposed
to identify Twitter accounts from a massive sam-
ple of “accounts which meet any one of a number
of criteria for ‘Australianness,’ rather than snow-
balling out from a set” (Bruns et al. 3). Using the
application program interface (API) provided by
Twitter, the team measured the outward connec-
tions of a sample of the Australian accounts. By
coding these accounts and grouping them based
on common interests through an algorithm, the re-
searchers were able to place them in communities
based on topic and follower clusters. This research
demonstrates a very clear cluster effect on Twit-
ter, what many call an ‘echo chamber’ when relat-
ing to politics especially. On the other hand, one
can attempt to use an Activity-based methodology
for measuring communities, as in the paper “In-
fluential Spreaders in the Political Twitter Sphere
of the 2013 Malaysian General Election”. This
process begins with clustering accounts in opinion
communities, but takes the further step of measur-
ing interactions (likes, retweets) in order to deter-
mine which accounts are the most influential in
their given communities (Hong-liang et al. 57-58).
This is particularly effective for short-term analy-
sis, as in this paper, which collected data over two
non-consecutive weeks, to study the relationship
between tweets and election data. Given this in-
formation regarding temporal effectiveness (long-
term vs. short term data analysis), it may be better
to use the short-term analysis to make up for the
short amount of time available to conduct this re-
search.
These papers have useful general principles
for Twitter research, but concern unrelated polit-
ical issues. The far-right, specifically on Twit-
ter, and specifically within the United States,
may have sufficiently different characteristics to
Malaysian General Election networks or Aus-
tralian society as a whole. The article “Research-
ing Far Right Groups on Twitter: Methodolog-
ical Challenges 2.0” presents possible solutions.
Specifically, the paper discusses ‘Traces’ (Cros-
set et al. 941). By performing basic algorithmic
content analysis, accounts can be identified related
to the alt-right. Particularly, the paper identifies
that the far-right hides behind a great deal of eu-
phemism and irony in order to recruit and spread
propaganda. The methodology, particularly iden-
tifying euphemisms frequently used by the far-
right, will be useful in my own research, since
groups like QAnon have a very specific vocabu-
lary that they use.
“The Alt-Right Twitter Census” by J. M.
Berger presents a number of methodological tech-
niques that will certainly prove useful in current
research. The goal of the paper was to conduct
a simple data gathering of the Twitter data of the
Alt-Right, and their associated mainstream right
counterparts. The report identifies several cate-
gories into which Alt-Right Twitter accounts fall,
based on their principle issue: immigration, sup-
port for Trump, white nationalism, or general ha-
rassment. These groups came into occasional con-
flict with one another. The research analyzed the
200 most recent tweets from more than 29,000 ac-
counts. The accounts were identified through the
Follower-Followee system of the Australian Twit-
ter Landscape paper, creating a map of Alt-Right
groups and their interactions with one another.
They then created a control group of approxi-
mately 30,000 accounts. The researchers gath-
ered data concerning account biographies, text in
tweets, and hashtag use. The goal of the paper
was quantitative, simply to measure the overall
presence of the Alt-Right online and to survey
which topics they discussed, where this study will
be qualitative. While this research does allow for
interesting collection techniques, content analysis
will require more investigation.
3. Research Design
First, we must discuss the possibilities for col-
lecting the data on Twitter. However, using the
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Twitter search function in and of itself is not suf-
ficient to the task, since Twitter is not a random
site, but influenced by thought leaders of clusters
of people. This Network-based analysis is what
is used in most examinations of Twitter data. In
order to judge the feelings of the community, we
give weight to the most popular figureheads in the
movement, accounts such @prayingmedic, an es-
tablished leader of the conspiracy theory with over
273,000 followers, and at least one retweet by the
President himself, on 21 February, 2020 (@pray-
ingmedic). By analyzing the accounts of accepted
and influential leaders in the community, we can
minimize the amount of non-real Twitter accounts
entering into our sample and jeopardizing the va-
lidity of the sample.
@Prayingmedic will act as our ‘leader ac-
count’, the nexus of our network. Having identi-
fied a leader, we take a sample from their follower
base, equal to 25 followers, screening each for
possibilities of being false accounts. From these
accounts we will screen the 10 most recent tweets,
whether retweets or original content. The reasons
for this small sample are twofold: firstly, that the
time required to screen thousands of tweets is not
within the bounds of this paper, and second, that
by automating the procedure, we risk the inclusion
of bot accounts or non-QAnon accounts. Follow-
ing this I will code the content of the tweets, as
explained in Section 3: Coding. This process will
then repeat for mainstream conservative tweets,
to compare the two’s rhetoric. On the part of
Conservative Twitter, there are a number of possi-
ble thought leader accounts, such as Ben Shapiro,
Tucker Carlson, Mitch McConnell, among various
others. Various factors come into play in deter-
mining which is most like @prayingmedic in kind,
if not in content, meaning that, for example, Mitch
McConnell’s rhetoric as Senate Majority Leader
will be quite different from that of Ben Shapiro, a
talk show host, or @prayingmedic, a private citi-
zen. I decided to use the account of House Minor-
ity Leader Kevin McCarthy, reasoning that he was
mainstream enough to attract a large following,
while not being a figurehead around which con-
spiracy theorists or alt-right figures congregate.
Specifically, we will be looking for violent or
dehumanizing rhetoric, searching for things such
as referring to groups of people (immigrants, Mus-
lims, LGBT people) as insects, vermin, plague,
or the like. This dehumanizing language is a
primer for violence against such groups (Luna
253). Likewise, we will code for references to
religion and to the economy, and consider senti-
ment more generally: whether the tweets on the
whole express positive or negative emotions. This
gives us more than one factor with which to com-
pare the QAnon movement with mainstream con-
servatives. Do they focus more on violent rhetoric,
while conservatives focus on economic policy and
news more generally? By comparing these mul-
tiple categories, we can better determine diver-
gences between the two.
Some may object that I am focusing only
on theoretical violence, rather than immediate
threats. In response, I posit that the question of
actualizing violent rhetoric is beyond the scope
of this particular paper, but presents interesting
avenues for future researchers to explore—how
can we accurately predict the likelihood of vio-
lent rhetoric being actualized, and can that predic-
tion be capitalized upon by intelligence agencies
and police forces while respecting civil liberties?
This paper is merely designed to measure rhetoric
and the differences in rhetoric between the two
groups, conspiracy theorists and mainstream con-
servatives.
4. Coding
Each of five different measures: Violence, Re-
ligiosity, Economy, Paranoia, and Sentiment, will
be measured on an interval scale of real numbers,
beginning at zero. Every violent word, for exam-
ple, will raise the violence scale by one. Likewise
for mentions of “Christ”, “Dollar”, “Love”, or
any QAnon-specific acronyms or initialisms, like
“WWG1WGA”, for religiosity, economy, positiv-
3
Planck: Where We Go One, We Go All
Published by eRepository @ Seton Hall, 2020
ity, and paranoia respectively. A word in ALL
CAPS receives double counting, as does a word
used as part of a hashtag, since both of these point
to particularly important information to the au-
thor. If a word is both capitalized and part of a
hashtag, it is only counted twice, coded as part
of a hashtag, since the hashtag is what is meant
to draw attention, not the capitalization. For ex-
ample, CHRIST would count for Religiosity=2.
Some may take issue with using integers alone
for the non-dichotomous variables, and not scaling
the variables as, for example, number of violent
words per hundred. The objection is waived, how-
ever, since all tweets are of roughly uniform size.
Were this piece researching blog posts, which may
vary from a Tweet-sized piece to a manifesto in
length, then scaling for length would be appro-
priate. However, in this case, the very data with
which we work has essentially solved this prob-
lem.
Each Tweet will also be coded on a scalar
variable of Positivity, Negativity, and Sentiment,
measuring the relative positive or negative emo-
tions of the tweets. In many ways, these are very
context-specific variables. For every positive word
or phrase in a tweet, “Good job”, for instance, that
variable will be increased by one. Likewise, for
words like “hate”, the Negativity variable will be
decremented by one. Once these two variables
have been coded, they will be summed, and that
value will be entered as Sentiment. This variable
will provide a holistic measure of the overall pos-
itive or negative feelings of the tweets.
Further, each measure will have a paired
nominal scale measuring only the presence of
each of the variables within the tweets. If
there is any kind of violent rhetoric in a tweet,
the Presence Violence variable, for instance, will
measure “1” for yes. If the opposite, it will mea-
sure “0” for no. This variable allows for com-
parison between the Conservative sample and the
QAnon sample, judging an absolute number of vi-
olent or religious tweets, and comparing them.
Coders will be two of my undergraduate col-
leages, and will be instructed to code not only the
tweet itself, but the photo it is associated with or
the tweet to which it is replying if they seem to
be in agreement. As we are attempting to measure
Conservative or Conspiracist viewpoints alone, it
would be counterintuitive to code, for instance,
a tweet by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez, as the subject of a taunting reply. How-
ever, if an account tries to support an idea, it will
be coded as part of the sample, considered as rep-
resentative of the subject account’s opinions, and
thus worthy of measurement. The contents of
videos have been excluded from the sample, but
where there is significant textual commentary in
the tweet, with a video attached, coders will be in-
structed to count the commentary in the sample.
The process of coding will use two coders. Each
will be assigned a random sample of the data.
Since the sample is 500 total tweets, each individ-
ual coder will be given 300 tweets total. This is
to accounts for 1.) their share of the coded tweets
(250), and 2.) intercoder reliability, an overlap of
10% of the sample between coders to test whether
methods are accurate and valid across different
people.
5. Example
As an example of the coding process, we will
use the top QAnon tweet on Twitter as of 4:00
PM, 20 March, 2020, displayed in Figure 1. This
tweet is a particularly good example, as it provides
a number of extremes for our coding system to
measure. The tweet is long and full of text, ideal
for the methodology. How best would we code
this Tweet? “FIGHTING” is used twice, count-
ing for a total of 4 in Violence, two for each men-
tion of the word, doubled since both are in caps.
Add on 2 for “WAR”. “NOT...CLEAN” likewise
receives two. Finally, a single point for the inclu-
sion of the “U.S. Military”. The “Chain of Com-
mand” comment is not typically used by QAnon
in reference to the U.S. Military’s Chain of Com-
mand, but rather to the President and White House
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Figure 1. Example coding tweet.
specifically, so it does not receive a rating on the
violence measure. Thus, the Pres Viol variable =
1, and the Deg Viol = 9.
Let us turn to an examination of Religious
aspects. “Have FAITH...HAVE FAITH” are the
explicitly religious references in the tweet, cod-
ing at two each, for its religious reference and
use of capitals. Some may point to the first line
“We are FIGHTING for LIFE” as a possible ex-
ample, perhaps referring to religious-based pro-
life advocacy, but there is insufficient evidence
in the remainder of the tweet to substantiate this
claim. Therefore, the Pres Rel variable = 1, and
the Deg Rel variable = 4. The tweet does not seem
to mention economics in any meaningful way.
Thus, it would receive a 0 in both the Pres Econ
and Deg Econ variables. Paranoia is a more dif-
ficult metric, as it is even more subjective than
its counterparts. However, some aspects, such as
“[SCARE] NECESSARY EVENT” or “WE ARE
IN CONTROL” point each to the certain paranoid
conspiracy-mongering that we’re looking for, so a
total of Pres Par=1 and Deg Par=4.
Finally, we examine overall sentiment. The
overall process, using all of the above variables,
eventually brings the total of sentiment to +8. A
total of 10 negative sentiment and 18 positive sen-
timent. Despite advocating for violence, the tweet
primarily uses positive sentiment to do so, much
like a rallying cry.
6. Intercoder Reliability
Using the open source statistical software
Gretl, I was able to analyze the data that my coders
provided. First, I wanted to establish whether the
methodology was reliable between coders. For
this, I utilized two-sample t-tests, testing the dif-
ference of means between the coders’ ratings on
Degree of Violence and Degree of Paranoia.
First, an examination of Degree of Violence.
My coders did not have a significant difference in
either measuring Degree or Presence of Violence.
In order to statistically test this, I performed a t-
test on the means of each coder’s samples. First,
the tests for Presence Variables, both of Paranoia
and of Violence. The p-value of the Pres Paranoia
test was equal to .547, a good indicator that the test
for paranoia held a good amount of intercoder reli-
ability. The other test garnered remarkable results.
The test for Pres Violence yielded a p-value equal
to 1. In this case, we see that the coders identically
identified the number of tweets in the intercoder
test for the Presence of Violence, an excellent in-
dicator that intercoder reliability is strong.
Having established that my coders had simi-
lar results for identifying tweets containing vio-
lent and paranoid rhetoric, and found independent
agreement with one another, I moved on to estab-
lish that their methods of gauging the amount of
violence or paranoia in any given tweet correlated
similarly. Running the same tests, for the same
variables’ Degree counterparts, I was able to de-
termine that the coders had a strong correlation in
their identification of degrees of paranoia through-
out the sample, with a p = .84. While they had
some divergence on identifying which tweets were
paranoid, when they did identify paranoid tweets,
they were able to do so in highly similar manners.
Contrast this with the Deg Violence test. This test
had a p-value of .56, a much stronger difference
than the other variable. This indicates that, while
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the coders were able to identify violent tweets in
a highly similar manner, they still had some di-
vergence on their methods of coding the violence
contained within each tweet. While not signifi-
cant enough to bring the intercoder reliability into
question, it indicates that, in the future, consider-
ation must be taken by researchers as to the way
that their coders rate violence, to ensure the utmost
validity. In conclusion, the high intercoder relia-
bility my research demonstrates is a positive sign
both for the validity of this paper and for future
work concerning the content analysis of tweets us-
ing this method.
7. Paranoia
The QAnon movement, like many conspiracy
theories, is considerably characterized by para-
noia. The movement folds in a number of dif-
ferent theories, possibly as part of its nature as
a decentralized internet following. Various ideas
can be proposed and other conspiracy theories can
be brought into the grander narrative. What is
more, various groups can disagree with each other
on the specifics of who exactly is to blame in the
theory, while still maintaining a cohesion around
the figure of ‘Q’. One finds a number of people
are to blame, depending on the individual asked.
Some blame extraterrestrials, others blame Jews,
and still others blame, for example, the Cult of
Moloch, an ancient mythic religion. However,
they are all united in the thought that a nebulous
‘other’ is to blame for the problems of the world
at large.
Some examples of this behavior were demon-
strated in our sample, which included a num-
ber of different conspiracy theories, from the
adrenochrome conspiracy, centering around the
extraction of a random hormone form trafficked
children on behalf of Hollywood elites, to Pizza-
gate, the theory that the ‘deep state cabal’ uses
codes such as ‘Cheese Pizza’ in emails to refer,
once again, to trafficked children. The paranoia of
the movement is particularly troubling. It demon-
strates a deep institutional distrust on the part of a
not-insignificant population of Americans.
When studying the Paranoia of the movement,
I decided to provide my coders with a glossary of
terms, in order to help them decipher the many
terms which the movement tends to use in order to
communicate its paranoia. As already discussed in
Section Five: Intercoder Reliability, I found that
my coders had a high amount of reliability be-
tween each other when determining the amount
of Paranoia present in each tweet. Let us now
discuss the interpretation of the data collected on
Paranoia.
First, I conducted another difference of means
test on the samples, this time between tweets from
QAnon associated accounts and Conservative as-
sociated accounts. While I suspected that the an-
swer would be somewhat obvious, that a conspir-
acy theory would demonstrate more paranoia than
a mainstream political movement, it was still nec-
essary for two reasons. First, it was necessary to
determine whether or not our samples had signifi-
cant crossover between each other. This helped to
determine whether or not the methodology, of col-
lecting followers from a thought leader and then
sampling their tweets, provided an accurate pic-
ture of two different communities, rather than ei-
ther one community with some variation, or two
communities with a great deal of crossover, thus
making data collection and interpretation difficult
and possibly invalid.
I compared the two samples’ means of Degree
of Paranoia, including those with a Degree mea-
surement of 0. The first sample, that represented
the QAnon movement, had an average Degree of
Paranoia of 2.54, while the Conservative sample’s
mean was 1.95. Conducting a standard two tailed
t-test, I found that the test statistic was 2.36, with
a p of .018. The results of the test are displayed in
Figure 2.
The test demonstrates that there does indeed
exist a significant difference between the two sam-
ples. While conservatives do demonstrate some
amount of paranoia, the QAnon tweeters were
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Figure 2. Difference of means, degree of Paranoia.
considerably more so, almost two and a half stan-
dard deviations away from the Conservative mean.
This confirms that the samples were, at least in
some regard, significantly different from one an-
other, demonstrating that these are two separate
communities, with different ideals and ways of
thinking, or at least, of expressing that thought.
What I believe accounts for the difference be-
tween the two samples is the much higher level of
paranoia that some QAnon accounts have, bring-
ing the overall average up. In order to test this, I
ran a Binary Logistic Regression, using Presence
of Paranoia Variable against the dummy variable
that determined whether a specific tweet was part
of the QAnon sample. The results are displayed in
Fig. 3.
Figure 3. Binary logistic regression, QAnon
dummy variable and Presence of Violence.
Here, one sees that there is not a signifi-
cant enough correlation between any given tweet
demonstrating the presence of paranoia and be-
ing in the QAnon sample. In absolute numbers,
149 QAnon tweets, 59% of their sample, demon-
strated paranoia. Contrast with 160 Conservative
tweets, 64% of the sample. If the QAnon sam-
ple does not simply have a much larger number
of tweets with paranoia in them, and rather has
a similar amount of observations to their coun-
terparts, the only logical explanation for the dif-
ference between the two in terms of Degree must
be that the tweets which do demonstrate the pres-
ence of paranoia in the QAnon sample must have a
higher degree of paranoia within them. The high-
est QAnon tweets rated as 16’s and 17’s, generally
consisting of heavy usage of hashtags and of cap-
itals, denoting a particular commitment to getting
out the message via hashtags, discussing topics al-
ready named in this paper, see Fig. 4 for an ex-
ample of this kind of ‘evangelizing’ tweet. These
tweets would generally focus on the repetition of
topics in said hashtags, likely focusing on casting
a broad net for possible casual searchers to find a
QAnon tweet and be dragged into the community
as a whole.
Figure 4. Example high Paranoia tweet.
Many of the more paranoid tweets focused
on Numerology, the process of translating words
into number, and those numbers back into words.
These tweets generally focus on attempting to
decode messages from the President or other
sources, as seen in Figure 5, which attempts to
construct a connection between the President’s
May 2017 tweet and the COVID-19 pandemic. It
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helps to demonstrate as well, the leaps of logic that
defines the paranoia of these tweets, making as-
sumptions and connections with no evidence be-
hind them.
Figure 5. A QAnon tweet demonstrating numerol-
ogy.
However, the most paranoid tweets in the
QAnon sample did not focus on either decod-
ing messages or on evangelizing, but rather on
target identification and accusations. Of the 8
tweets above the 95th percentile of observations
for degree of paranoia, 5 named specific individ-
uals or groups of people responsible for crimes
which they likewise outline in their tweets. In-
dividuals are not only politicians, but also main-
stream celebrities, while organizations tend to be
the Democratic Party, tech companies, and the
business side of the Military Industrial Complex,
while the military itself is beyond reproach. See,
for example, Figure 6 and Figure 7. The first con-
cerns the data collection practices of Google and
other tech companies, claiming both that they are
associated with the Mark of the Beast, and that
they are colluding with Communist China. Here,
we see target identification of specific companies,
based on an accusation with no evidence behind
it, and further, the baseless tie, the leap of logic, to
something like a shibboleth of ‘the enemy’, a fig-
ure around which hate can be easily directed, and
a figure who is so universally hated by the com-
munity as to make mutual identification easy.
Figure 7 depicts another of these tweets, but
one which focuses on accusing individuals rather
Figure 6. Paranoia towards organizations.
than organizations. These tweets are particularly
concerning, as they provide actionable targets for
potential violent actors to move against, as demon-
strated by the 2018 ‘Magabomber’, who targeted
people such as George Soros or Hillary Clinton,
commonly named in these kind of conspiracy the-
ories. This, paired with the specific accusations
about child abduction and murder, make for a pos-
sibly dangerous formula where theorists not only
have specific targets, but believe them to be guilty
of heinous crimes and going unpunished.
Figure 7. Paranoia towards individuals.
Contrast this with the Conservative sample,
where the highest outlier was rated a 12, while all
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other observations were rated 10 or lower. Fur-
ther, the primary focus of the paranoia in the Con-
servative sample was not on violent cabals or on
governmental plots, but primarily the theory that
the news media, inclusive of every major chan-
nel, even including Fox News, were conspiring to
underreport the successes of President Trump and
overreport his failures. These were counted as part
of a paranoid mindset, since such rhetoric betrays
a form of unfounded distrust in an institution, even
if, instead of a governmental body, it is the fourth
estate.
When examining the outliers of the Conserva-
tive sample, those above the 95th percentile, there
begins to be cross-contamination between the two
samples. There were only 5 outliers in this popu-
lation, and three of them concerned QAnon or the-
ories related to QAnon. One of the other two fo-
cused on the theory that the Coronavirus was fake,
using #filmyourhospital to try and get people to
prove that hospitals were not, in fact, overrun, and
were deceiving the public to some as yet unknown
end. The other concerned the conspiracy theory
concerning Joe Biden and his son’s involvement
in the gas company Burisma.
The fact that the most paranoid tweets in the
Conservative sample, more often than not, in-
cluded QAnon references or rhetoric, provides a
signal that the movement has a significant amount
of paranoia separate from the Conservative sam-
ple, and which has not quite become a signifi-
cant presence in the Conservative movement as a
whole.
8. Violence
Now we will discuss the principle variables for
this paper, measuring the Presence and Degree of
Violence within a given tweet. For the purposes
of measuring Violence, it is worth reminding the
reader that this paper is merely measuring vio-
lent rhetoric, and what potential insights can be
gleaned into the mindset of the community. The
probability of that rhetoric being actualized into
real-world violence against any particular people
is out of the scope of this paper, but presents inter-
esting avenues for future research.
How comfortable are these populations with,
at least in their own anonymous echo chamber, ex-
pressing a desire to inflict violence on other peo-
ple? In accord with this goal, I instructed my
coders to code not only for direct and actionable
threats (i.e. “I’ll kill you”) but also for support of
state agencies being deployed to use the monopoly
the state has on the means of violence (i.e “Arrest
Ilhan Omar”), and also to code slurs and other de-
grading language (i.e. “Maggot”, and others less
mentionable here). This last qualification for rat-
ing a word or phrase as violent may be unintu-
itive at first, but is included in the data based on
the notion that hate speech is a vector for vio-
lence, identifying potential groups as targets and
furthering an us vs. them mentality that makes vi-
olence come more easily. The thought runs that
hate speech increases bias, “bias converts into dis-
criminatory thoughts and behavior and in some
may lead to acts of direct violence, as above, like
a mass shooting” (Zakrison 674).
Likewise, I instructed the coders to code
rhetoric which attempted to paint the potential en-
emies identified by the theory as violent. The rea-
son for this is that painting a potential enemy as
violent is a primer for violence. As outlined in
the paper “Understanding Conspiracy Theories”,
“[conspiracists] use conspiracy theories to create
the ideological conditions for extremism and po-
litical violence. These include fear of Muslims
and radical distrust of political leaders and in-
stitutions which are represented either complicit
with Islamists or their dupes—beliefs that inspired
Anders Breivik’s massacre of left-wing youth in
Oslo” (Douglas et al. 14). While this sentence
relates specifically to anti-Muslim conspiracy the-
ories, the principle holds true for those theorizing
about the ‘deep state’, or about Hillary Clinton’s
blood-drinking.
Travis Brisini discusses Mrs. Clinton’s role in
conspiracy theories as it parallels the witch-hunts
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of European history. He writes in comparison
between the accusations of cannibalism and the
hunts, “It was not necessarily a prefigured set of
specific crimes that motivated witch hunting—the
‘crimes’ themselves were loosely defined, largely
unprovable, and often so fantastical as to be im-
possible to commit—but rather the need for a
structure that would permit the application of pun-
ishment with ex post facto justifications and ev-
idence” (Brisini 214). In essence, the point of
painting the enemy as violent is to justify violence,
whether vigilante as in the cases of the so-called
‘MAGABomber’, or systemic, as in the calls for
the U.S. military to try and execute high-profile
Democrats. Even if a tweet does not contain the
call to violence, it still contains the justification
for said violence.
The first step in determining the relative vi-
olence of the community, like for Paranoia, was
to run a difference of means test, to determine
whether the two samples differed enough for fur-
ther analysis. The results of the test are laid out
in Fig. 8. As the reader can see, there is an even
stronger difference between the two means than in
the paranoia sample. The p-value is .011, which
causes me to reject the null hypothesis that the two
populations display no differences in their degree
of violence.
Figure 8. Difference of means, Degree of Violence.
Like in the Paranoia sample, there ought to be
a consideration as to whether a QAnon tweet is
more likely than a conservative tweet to display
violent tendencies. This helps to establish that
QAnon is not only more violent in individually
highly violent tweets, but also more likely to be
violent just by nature of being part of the com-
munity. Once again like the Paranoia tests, I con-
ducted a Logit test on the sample as a whole, using
the dummy variable determining whether a tweet
was part of the QAnon sample and the dummy
variable which measured whether there was any
violent ideation present in the tweet whatsoever.
The results are presented in Fig. 9. In this case, the
QAnon sample demonstrates a high correlation
between a given tweet being part of their commu-
nity and demonstrating violent behavior. The re-
sults of this test provide evidence that the QAnon
community has cultivated a community of violent
ideation.
Figure 9. Binary logistic regression, QAnon
dummy variable and Presence of Violence.
It behooves us to examine the types of vio-
lence that the QAnon sample demonstrates. Prin-
cipally, the tweets demonstrate the justifications
for violence earlier discussed. Take, for instance,
Figs. 10 and 11, which demonstrate the two tweets
which scored the highest on the Degree of Vio-
lence scale of all of the QAnon samples, at 10
each. The first, Fig. 10, links to a Madonna perfor-
mance for the song competition Eurovision 2019,
but alleges that it is an example of a cultish cere-
mony. The nature of the collected tweet’s reply is
intensely othering. It is designed to identify per-
fectly normal celebrities and politicians as beyond
human reasoning or mercy, as psychopathic. This
othering is the first step towards violence. The
specificity of the accusations is common among
this type of tweet, outlining vague connections be-
tween specific public figures, such as former Pres-
ident Obama, and their supposed true, cultish mo-
tives.
The second tweet, Figure 11, is slightly dif-
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Figure 10. Othering of public figures through base-
less claims.
ferent in mindset than the tweet in Figure 10.
When compared to its counterpart, it demonstrates
something of a cleavage in the more radical side
of the QAnon community, namely the difference
between the religious/supernaturalist side of the
community, and the more materially grounded,
economic side. The tweet makes no reference to
spirituality, to magic, or to rituals. Rather, it is al-
most McCarthyism for the modern day, focusing
on rooting out the enemies within who are at war
with the United States, and on punishing those en-
emies through state violence, based off of no evi-
dence. The enemies are hidden, and by their very
nature of being hidden, could be anywhere. How-
ever, rather than warlocks or Satanists, the ene-
mies are economic in nature, seeking socialism or
communism, or to control the media. By portray-
ing the current political situation as a war, a world
war at that, the account is calling for identification
as part of an army, protecting the United States
from those who wish to do it harm. It is a form of
preparation for vigilantism.
The final form of violent tweet characterizes
the vast majority of the QAnon movement’s vio-
lent rhetoric, rating around a 3 or 4 on the De-
gree of Violence scale. It does not principally fo-
cus on painting the enemy as evil witches, nor on
McCarthyite tactics of more materially grounded
crimes, but rather expresses a unique sentiment. It
Figure 11. McCarthyite tactics of claiming the exis-
tence of hidden enemies.
shares the distrust of the ‘deep state’ that the other
two share, but prefers to take a more backseat ap-
proach. These accounts are more observers than
anything else. They do not seek to call others to
arms, as in Figure 11, “Get ready to fight the hid-
den enemies”, and they do not focus on accusa-
tions of specific individuals, such as is displayed
in Figure 10. These tweets will, like in the ex-
ample, often use biblical imagery, but the crimes
alleged are not necessarily supernatural in nature,
which excludes them from inclusion in the first
type of violent tweet.
Figure 12. Discipline and punishment through
higher authorities.
These tweets are the background noise of the
movement, the average. They reflect a content-
ment to abdicate responsibility for the actual work
of identifying and rooting out such hidden ene-
mies, trusting the President and those close to him
to leverage the violence of the state on their behalf.
Violent conservative rhetoric takes a much dif-
ferent tack from that of the QAnon movement.
Where the conspiracy theorists discuss present-
11
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day violence, and glorify the prospect of engag-
ing in that violence, conservatives focus on the vi-
olence of the past, mythologizing it and viewing
it as a potential future guide, but not one that is
likely to be actualized. Consider Figure 13, dis-
playing a tweet which rated above average on De-
gree of Violence. The tweet discussed a founda-
tional moment in American history, the War of In-
dependence, and holds up the violence by which
independence was achieved as a positive. It then
reminds its audience to be prepared for the poten-
tial of future violence, although it is not immedi-
ately at hand.
Figure 13. Mythologizing of past violence as justi-
fication for unlikely future violence.
This is the primary difference between the
conservative sample and the QAnon sample. The
QAnon sample believes that the moment for vio-
lence is either here or close at hand. The conser-
vative sample believes that violence is a potential
for the future, but that the conditions have not yet
been met for that violence to be necessary.
9. Religiosity and Economy
The other gathered variables, Religiosity and
Economy, returned data which suggests another
cleavage between the QAnon and mainstream
Conservative sample. Where the former sample is
primarily concerned with religion, the latter sam-
ple takes far more time to discuss economic issues.
This parallels the split between the neoconserva-
tive and business wing of the Republican party and
the Evangelical Christian wing, the “three-legged
stool” that makes up their base.
The Qanon sample demonstrates a much
higher degree of religiosity on average than their
Conservative counterparts. This presents an-
other interesting avenue for further research, into
whether evangelicals are more likely to support
this theory than neoconservatives are. In order to
determine the statistical extent of the difference,
the test used was a difference of means two tailed
t-test, applied to both variables. First, to discuss
religiosity. The results of the Religiosity test are
detailed in Figure 14. With a p-value of .029, the
data does suggest that there may be a correlation
between membership in the Evangelical Christian-
ity and QAnon.
Figure 14. Difference of means, Religiosity.
The kind of religiosity that the QAnon move-
ment demonstrates is worth examining. They gen-
erally focus on apocalyptic themes, such as quo-
tations from or references to the Book of Revela-
tions. They take on an eschatological figure, pre-
millennial in nature, as though they are attempt-
ing to predict the second coming of Christ and are
looking forward to the “silent war”, as shown in
Figure 15.
The QAnon movement views the conspiracy
in the terms of apocalypse, of a final great battle
to destroy all evil and achieve the victory of all
that is good. Even in their religious tweets, the
movement demonstrates a desire for conflict and
for violence, to be part of a war, to take part in
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righteous battle.
Figure 15. QAnon eschatological religiosity.
As further evidence for the possibility of the
factional split between evangelicals and neocon-
servatives paralleling the split between the sam-
ple of conservatives and QAnon adherents, there
are the results of the same difference of means
test conducted for the degree of economy vari-
able. The results demonstrate the exact oppo-
site of the degree of religiosity variable, namely
that the QAnon sample is extremely less likely to
talk about economic matters than the members of
the Conservative sample. The p-value of this test
was 3.97×10−5, a remarkably stark difference in
rhetorical topics between the two communities, as
demonstrated in Figure 16.
Figure 16. Difference of means, Economy.
This data indicates that there may be a signif-
icant relationship between evangelicalism and be-
lief in the QAnon conspiracy theory, at least from
the perspective of the ways that the QAnon the-
ory expresses itself. Do evangelical belief systems
play a contributing role in distrust of government
and other institutions, in a way that neoconserva-
tive belief systems do not?
In conclusion, the QAnon sample and the Con-
servative sample demonstrate a key cleavage that
defines their communities, outside of the belief or
lack thereof in the conspiracy theory. Where one
prefers to discuss religious matters, the other pri-
marily concerns itself with economic matters.
10. Regressions
The full understanding of this issue requires an
analysis of the relationship between the variables
themselves. How do each of the variables of de-
gree interact with each other?
First, we will discuss the relationship between
violence and paranoia, examining the whole sam-
ple, the QAnon sample, and the Conservative
sample respectively. These two variables cor-
relate moderately to weakly, with a p-value of
3.67×10−18 and a correlation coefficient of .258.
This does imply a weak positive correlation be-
tween paranoia and violence, that as paranoia in-
creases, violence likewise increases, although not
as strongly correlated as might be supposed. The
correlation between violence and paranoia is simi-
Figure 17. OLS graph: Degree of Violence and De-
gree of Paranoia, whole sample.
lar between the QAnon and conservative samples,
with a Correlation Coefficient of .255 and .222 re-
spectively. This indicates that, as either ideology
becomes more paranoid, they are likely to become
more violent in their rhetoric, typically invoking
13
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the state’s mechanisms for violence.
Figure 18. OLS table: Degree of Violence against
Degree of Paranoia. Top to Bottom: Whole sample,
QAnon, and Conservative.
The variable which measures Degree of Re-
ligiosity correlates much less strongly with De-
gree of Violence than Paranoia does, and Degree
of Economy does not correlate with Degree of
Violence whatsoever. The correlation coefficient
for Degree of Religiosity is .136, indicating the
model is not very accurate at determining the re-
lationship between religion and violent rhetoric.
Even when taking the QAnon example by itself,
the correlation coefficient is only .163. However,
the p-value for the overall sample when consid-
ering the two variables is .0023, which indicates
that there does exist a statistically significant rela-
tionship between the two variables. The Degree of
Economy variable has no relationship with the De-
gree of Violence variable whatsoever. The p-value
for the Ordinary Least Squares regression between
the two is .589. Whether a given tweet discusses
economic matters has no bearing on whether it
will use violent rhetoric to convey its thesis.
The final regression to examine is the rela-
tionship between the Sentiment of a given tweet
and its propensity for violence. It may seem in-
tuitive that as violence goes up, overall sentiment
decreases. This is not always the case, however, as
demonstrated by the coding of the example tweet
in Section Four. Violence can be portrayed not
as a negative thing, but as a social good, as the
glorious means to the prelapsarian future. In the
model, Degree of Sentiment is weakly negatively
correlated with Degree of Violence, with a p-value
of 1.21×10−11, and r = .297. This demonstrates
that Sentiment and Violence are related in a simi-
lar manner to Religiosity and Violence, that Senti-
ment is not a good predictor of Violence, but does
have a relationship.
The only variable which has any predictive
power of the violent rhetoric that a tweet will dis-
play is the Degree of Paranoia. Each other, besides
Degree of Economy, has a relationship with De-
gree of Violence, but doesn’t have any meaningful
predictive power.
Figure 19. OLS graph: Degree of Violence against
Degree of Sentiment.
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Figure 20. OLS table: Degree of Violence against
Degree of Sentiment.
11. Limitations
This study is limited in several ways that re-
quire further research to be conducted. First, it
only concerns the social network Twitter. Because
social networks are each structured so uniquely,
the solutions which work for one will not nec-
essarily work for another. Further, the types of
rhetoric seen on any given social network may
vary dramatically based on the parameters the site
allows for expression. For example, Twitter lim-
its each Tweet to 280 characters, where posts on
sites such as Reddit may be the size of an essay in
length.
Secondly, this research’s sample size is very
small, especially when considering the volume of
traffic on Twitter. In order to more fully under-
stand the QAnon movement on Twitter, automa-
tion must be used to gather a sample in the thou-
sands or tens of thousands of tweets, rather than
utilizing a variant of chain sampling. Both the size
and the method of sampling limit the validity of
the paper without further research.
Third, the predictive power of the variable
measuring Degree of Paranoia is not strong
enough on its own using the existing model to
draw definitive conclusions. Through further
study of the kind of rhetoric that the QAnon move-
ment uses, as well as the theories they promote,
the hypothesis of paranoia acting as a good predic-
tor of violent rhetoric might be more definitively
confirmed.
12. Responses and Conclusion
The QAnon movement, thus far, has been re-
sponsible for a number of crimes, violent and
non-violent alike (McIntire and Roose). Their
rhetoric demonstrates a commitment to painting
their enemies as supernatural foes, committing
foul crimes without repercussion, a recipe for vig-
ilantism. What, then, is the role of the govern-
ment in addressing the growth and networking of
this movement? In truth, the United States gov-
ernment has very little power to limit the ability of
QAnon members to organize and discuss online,
as their speech falls under the protections of free
speech, as they are currently understood, outlined
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, handed down in 1969.
The case establishes that, in order for the gov-
ernment to curtail a citizen’s speech, it must intend
to produce imminent lawless action. The extent to
which speech over social media relates to ‘immi-
nence’ is debated, generally concerning whether
imminence ought to be measured as relating to
the speaker/poster, or relating to the viewer, which
may happen at any point in the future, as long as
the post remains on the social network (Beausoleil
2134).
This lack of promoting imminent action be
taken precludes the involvement of government
actors on a wide scale, although more specific ac-
tions may be taken to target particularly violent
individual accounts. One method of screening for
these accounts may be to use a measure of para-
noia, as outlined in this paper: a glossary of terms
generally associated with the conspiracy specifi-
cally, giving particular weight to hashtags and cap-
itals. Using a method akin to this, law enforce-
ment may be able to target specifically violent ac-
tors in the community to surveil for possible crim-
inal activity.
One group which will have a vital role to play
in curbing QAnon’s spread, and the spread of
other conspiracy theories, are the social networks
themselves. Many of the tweets in the sample
clearly broke the community guidelines of Twitter,
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specifically their March 2019 prohibition against
the glorification of violence. By enforcing their
community guidelines more strictly, Twitter can
play a vital role in ensuring that these theories
are not allowed to spread, at least through their
own platform. The principal means of combat-
ting the spread of hate speech or violent speech
on a platform is to consider the means by which
that platform allows users to connect with one an-
other and form communities. On the social media
site Reddit, the wholesale banning of two commu-
nities which practiced hate speech on their plat-
form did not lead to a proliferation of hate speech
there, even as members of the communities spread
throughout the rest of the site, and in fact, their in-
dividual uses of hate speech decreased by 80%.
(Chandrasekharan 11).
Where Twitter is concerned, there are no for-
mal communities to ban; the site is structured very
differently to Reddit. In this case, possible inter-
ventions might include disallowing certain hash-
tags to be searchable or to trend, thus limiting
recruitment and keeping the movement contained
to a small population. Likewise, being more ag-
gressive with bans of members who use violent
or dehumanizing rhetoric in their tweets will fur-
ther decrease the existing population on the site.
While this will not dismantle the theory by any
means, their primary congregation occurring on
the anonymous image boards 4chan and 8kun, it
will at least curtail the spread of the theory to the
main user base of Twitter.
The QAnon movement represents a growing
trend of belief in conspiracy theories in the Ameri-
can public, to the extent that one study found “over
55% of respondents in 2011 agreed with at least
one [theory]” (Oliver and Wood 956). Much ef-
fort will have to be expended to combat this grow-
ing distrust of institutions, both of government, of
media, and of business. Twitter only represents
one area where these ideas can be combatted and
contained, and a positive effort to restore trust be-
tween Americans and their institutions must be
made.
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